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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
) NO.: 3:06-cr-00099 JWS
)
) **Plaintiff,**)
)
) **v.**)
)
) **THOMAS T. ANDERSON,**) **DEFENDANT THOMAS T. ANDERSON'S**
) **SENTENCING MEMORANDUM**
) **Defendant.**)
)

COMES NOW, Defendant, Thomas T. Anderson, and hereby submits his *Sentencing Memorandum* for the purpose of aiding the Court in imposing sentence.

A. INTRODUCTION

The Defendant, Thomas T. Anderson ("Mr. Anderson") recognizes that he violated an important public trust and must be punished. Mr. Anderson also recognizes and admits that he, in fact, violated the law, although that was not his intention when he began his discussions in 2004 with Bill Bobrick and Frank Prewitt. As explained below, Mr. Anderson believed *at the time*, that his actions were not in any way unlawful. Shortly, he will stand before this Court, and also before his family and

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1 the community where he was born, raised, and has lived, and
2 asking ultimately, for forgiveness. He also will ask this
3 Court's consideration of granting a measure of leniency,
4 compassion and mercy. He will recognize that he erred; he will
5 confirm that he accepts responsibility for his actions; he will
6 ask with humility that this Court consider a sentence below the
7 projected United States Sentencing Guideline level (hereinafter
8 referred to as "U.S.S.G."). He will not justify or rationalize
9 his actions as they are not justifiable. He will not ask the
10 people of the State of Alaska to trust his remorse, as he
11 recognizes that he has compromised that trust. Mr. Anderson
12 merely asks that the Court sentence him as an individual, devoid
13 of public sentiment and pressure; devoid of unjustified emotion;
14 devoid of anger. Mr. Anderson recognizes that he will be
15 incarcerated. It is anticipated that the Defense and the
16 Government will not concur as to what represents a sufficient -
17 and reasonable - sentence and appropriate prison term.

18 The Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter referred
19 to as "PSI") recommends that Mr. Anderson be sentenced to the
20 statutory maximum of 63 to 78 months of imprisonment. The
21 Defense suggests that under all of the facts and circumstances,
22 the imposition of such a sentence would be unreasonable. The
23 PSI does a thorough, thoughtful and largely accurate job of
24 detailing the offense characteristics, but it provides an

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1 incomplete, if not clinical view, of Mr. Anderson's life and
2 accomplishments. Accordingly, the PSI assigns little value in
3 its sentencing recommendation to the wealth of exceptional
4 contributions that Mr. Anderson has made throughout his public,
5 civic and professional life. Instead, it mechanically applies
6 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual to this case and, in so
7 doing, declines to credit Mr. Anderson's unique offense and
8 offender characteristics such as civic contributions, charitable
9 work, his remorse, and the aberrant nature of his actions.

10 **B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

11 As the Court is undoubtedly aware that on January 12, 2005
12 the United States Supreme Court inexorably altered the doctrinal
13 landscape of federal sentencing with its decision in *United*
14 *States v. Booker*, 542 U.S. 220 (2005). The Court, in *Booker*,
15 made it clear that United States District Courts are no longer
16 bound or restricted by a mandatory and unwavering application of
17 the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Writing for the merits
18 majority, Justice Stevens wrote that:

19 If the Guidelines as currently written could
20 be read as merely advisory provisions that
21 recommended, rather than required, the
22 selection of particular sentences in response
23 to differing sets of facts, their use would
24 not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have
25 never doubted the authority of a judge to
26 exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range.

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1 As well, Justice Breyer, in writing for the majority in the
2 remedial portion of the decision, stated:

3 We answer the question of remedy by finding
4 the provision of the federal sentencing
5 statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory,
6 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004),
7 incompatible with today's constitutional
8 holding.

9 Certainly, the inherent wisdom of 20 years of sage case law
10 as well as academic and institutional research should not be
11 disregarded and it is anticipated that this Court, like the many
12 other United States District Courts, will continue to seek
13 guidance from, rely on, consult, and utilize the provisions of
14 the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, as amended; the United States
15 Sentencing Guidelines; and the vast decisional resources
16 interpreting and applying the above. However, with the Court's
17 release from the mandatory strictures of the United States
18 Sentencing Guidelines, it is submitted that this Court may and
19 should more broadly exercise its discretion, and its role as the
20 final arbiter of the disposition in this case that best serves
21 the interests of justice, and fashion an individualized
22 sentence.¹

23 _____
24 ¹ "The District Courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must
25 consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
26 sentencing... The courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for
unreasonableness. These features of the remaining system, while not
the system Congress enacted, nevertheless continue to move sentencing
in Congress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive
sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to
individualize sentences where necessary." *Booker* at 264-265.

1 The Ninth Circuit has held that "we review post-Booker
 2 criminal sentences in two steps. First, we determine whether
 3 the district court properly calculated the applicable range
 4 under the advisory guidelines." *United States v. Cantrell*, 433
 5 F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th Cir. 2006); see also *United States v.*
 6 *Kimbrew*, 406 F.3d 1149, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2005). In evaluating
 7 the district court's application of the advisory guidelines, "we
 8 review its construction of the guidelines *de novo* and we review
 9 any factual findings made by the district court for clear error.
 10 *Cantrell*, 433 F.3d at 1279. We review the district court's
 11 application of the guidelines to the facts of the case for abuse
 12 of discretion." See, also, *United States v. Torres-Flores*, ---
 13 F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2473162 (9th Cir. 2007).

14 To be sure, sentencing courts must still consider the
 15 Guidelines after *Booker*, but those advisory Guidelines are but
 16 one of seven (7) statutory factors that are pertinent to the
 17 Court's sentencing judgment. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1) specifically
 18 requires the Court to consider Mr. Anderson's history and
 19 characteristics when imposing sentence.

20 Title 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (main ed. and Supp. 2004)
 21 provides:

22 Factors to be considered in imposing a
 23 sentence. The court shall impose a sentence
 24 sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
 25 to comply with the purposes set forth in
 26 paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court,

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in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed;

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for –

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines –

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(5) any pertinent policy statement –

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.

1 (6) the need to avoid unwarranted
2 sentence disparities among defendants with
3 similar records who have been found guilty
4 of similar conduct; and

5 (7) the need to provide restitution to
6 any victims of the offense."

7 As a result of *Booker*, no longer are courts *required* to
8 impose a sentence "within the range" as provided for in the
9 United States Sentencing Guidelines and as previously required
10 by 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1). Courts may now take into consideration
11 the myriad of sentencing factors, explicit and implicit, and
12 historically considered under 18 U.S.C. §3553.

13 Initially, we stress the importance of the parsimony
14 provision of the 18 U.S.C. §3553. That provision provides that
15 "The court *shall* impose a sentence sufficient, *but not greater*
16 *than necessary*, to comply with the purposes set forth in
17 paragraph (2) of this subsection." (Emphasis added) Thus, the
18 Court is statutorily bound *not* to impose a sentence greater than
19 what would be necessary to comply with the relevant sentencing
20 provisions discussed in *United States v. Wilson*, 350 F.Supp.2d
21 910, (DC Utah 2005) in which the court stated, "It is possible
22 to argue that this provision requires the courts to impose
23 sentences below the Guidelines range, because Guidelines
24 sentences are not parsimonious." *Id.* at 921.

25 Indeed, Judge Cassell noted that it was certainly debatable
26 that "the parsimony concept is powerful evidence... that both
the Senate and the House were attempting to pass a statute

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1 giving more substantial power to sentencing judges to impose a
2 sentence outside the guidelines range." *Id.* at 923. "District
3 court sentencing after *Booker* centers around 18 U.S.C. §3553(a),
4 which calls on the district court to 'impose a sentence
5 sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
6 purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection' and to
7 'consider' the [remaining §3553(a)] factors...." *See United*
8 *States v. Castillo*, 460 F.3d 337, 354 (2nd Cir. 2006); *see also*,
9 *United States v. Ministro-Tapia*, 470 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 2006).

10 The Second Circuit has stated that: "We have recognized
11 that district courts are to impose sentences pursuant to the
12 requirements of §3553(a) - *including the requirements of*
13 *§3553(a)'s parsimony clause* - while appellate courts are to
14 review the sentences actually imposed by district courts for
15 reasonableness." *United States v. Williams*, 475, 476 F.3d 468,
16 (2nd Cir 2007) (emphasis added).

17 Thirteen years ahead of his time, Judge Jack Weinstein of
18 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
19 York wrote: "A key provision [of sentencing] embodies the
20 concept of 'parsimony,' a principle of the American Bar
21 Association Standards for Criminal Justice." *See American Bar*
22 *Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, Chapter 18,*
23 *"Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures", 18 - 3.2(iii)*
24 *("Parsimony in the use of punishment is favored. The sentence*

1 imposed should therefore be the least severe sanction necessary
2 to achieve the purposes for which it is imposed..." (1993).
3 See also Richard S. Frase, *Sentencing Guidelines in the States:
4 Lessons for State and Federal Reformers*, 6 Federal Sentencing
5 Reporter 123, 124 (1993). This principle, when applied to
6 interpretation of criminal statutes, is known as lenity. "The
7 Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to
8 increase the penalty... when such an interpretation can be based
9 on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." *United*
10 *States v. Abbadessa*, 848 F.Supp.369, 378 (E.D.N.Y.1994). See,
11 also *United States v. Granderson*, 511 U.S. 39, (1994).

12 The parsimony provision of 18 U.S.C. §3553 requires that
13 the Court impose the *minimum* sentence possible under the
14 circumstances taking into account all of the 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)
15 factors. Therefore, the Court should not - and cannot - impose
16 a guideline sentence of 5.3 to 6.5 years if it concludes that a
17 lesser sentence would be sufficient to satisfy the goals of
18 punishment in the statute. Mr. Anderson respectfully submits
19 that a sentence of more than 27 to 33 months (Level 18) far
20 exceeds the "necessary" punishment in this case.

21 Prior to proceeding to the merits of the relevant 18 U.S.C.
22 §3553 factors, the Defense renews and recites its remaining
23 objections to the PSI calculations.

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C. OBJECTIONS TO PSI CALCULATIONS

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3D1.1 the Office of Probation grouped the counts into two separate groups as follows:

Group 1 (Counts 1, 2 3 and 7): 18 U.S.C. §371 (Conspiracy), 1951 (Extortion) and 666, (Hobbs Act.)

Group 2 (Count 4, 5 and 6): 18 U.S.C. §1956 (Money Laundering).

As to each, the Office of Probation suggested a Total Guideline Level as follows:

Group 1:

Base Offense Level (USSG §2C1.1)	<u>14</u>
Specific Offense Characteristics	
USSG §2C1.1(b)(1) (more than one bribe)	<u>0</u> ²
USSG §2B1.1 (more than \$10, 000)	<u>4</u> ³
USSG §2C1.1(b)(3) (elected official)	<u>4</u>
Adjusted Offense Level for Group 1	<u>22</u>

² The Draft PSI initially recommended that Mr. Anderson receive a 2 point upward enhancement for receiving more than 1 bribe, positing that the ATA consulting fees constituted a bribe. The Government concurred with this initial position and, of course, the Defense objected and addressed the issue on the merits. In the final PSI, the Office of Probation concurred with the Defense and concluded that it is legally and factually improper to apply the enhancement, and revised the calculations accordingly. Assuming, *arguendo*, the Government will continue to pursue the enhancement, the Defense addresses the issue at Section G *infra*.

³ Likewise, the initial Draft PSI also included the amount of Mr. Anderson's 2003 ATA contact (\$20,000), and in so doing, posited that for USSG§2B1.1 the amount of loss was a total of \$46, 000. The Office of Probation has concluded that there is not sufficient

Group 2

Base Offense Level (U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1)) 22

Specific Offense Characteristics

USSG §2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (more than one count) 2

USSG §2S1.1(b)(3) (Sophisticated laundering) 2

Adjusted Offense Level for Group 2 26

The Defense has no objection to the advisory guideline level calculation as to Group 1 but argues below that Mr. Anderson can and has demonstrated the requisite acceptance of responsibility so as to be entitled to an adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3E1.1. The Defense does object to the Specific Offense Characteristic as to the sophisticated laundering and believes that the proper guideline calculation for that Group should be 24, absent any Chapter 3 adjustments. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3D1.3(b), the highest offense level between the groups apply.

(i) Sophisticated Laundering - U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(3)

As stated above, the Defense does not believe that the offense characteristics support the conclusion that the crime involved "sophisticated" money laundering.

(A) Sophisticated Laundering under Subsection (b)(3). - For purposes of subsection (b)(3), "sophisticated laundering" means complex or intricate offense conduct pertaining to the

evidence to suggest that the ATA contract involved a bribe and has reduced the amount, removing the corresponding upward enhancement.

1 execution or concealment of the 18 U.S.C. § 1956
offense.

2 Sophisticated laundering typically
involves the use of -

- 3 (i) fictitious entities;
4 (ii) shell corporations;
5 (iii) two or more levels (i.e.,
6 layering) of transactions,
7 transportation, transfers, or
8 transmissions, involving criminally
9 derived funds that were intended to
10 appear legitimate; or
11 (iv) offshore financial accounts.

12 The lynchpin of the Office of Probation's supposition for
13 the application of the enhancement is its erroneous belief that
14 a shell corporation and layering was involved in the payments
15 from Pacific Publishing to Mr. Anderson.

16 The evidence presented at trial, as well as other
17 investigative materials, forces a contrary conclusion. The
18 evidence is unchallenged that Mr. Bobrick created Pacific
19 Publishing in the early summer of 2004. It was a public
20 corporation registered through the Alaska Department of
21 Commerce. Mr. Bobrick in his statement to the FBI on October
22 10, 2006, as documented in an FBI 302 (attached as Exhibit A)⁴
23 made it very clear that his initial relationship with Mr.
24 Anderson was intended to "groom" Mr. Anderson to become a
25 lobbyist after serving in public office, so that he, Bobrick,
26 could ultimately retire from lobbying:

27 During their acquaintance, ANDERSON spoke
28 with source and stated he wanted to be a

29 ⁴ In the 302, William Bobrick is identified as "Source."

1 lobbyist. After 18 years as a lobbyist,
2 source felt "burned out." Source did not
3 want to just "drop" clients after many years
4 of representation, and felt that he/she could
5 groom ANDERSON as a lobbyist for those
6 clients. Source believed he/she could have a
7 lobbyist firm with ANDERSON, and gradually
8 transition out of the business.

9 (Exhibit A, p.2)

10 Further, it is very clear that Pacific Publishing was
11 created as a legitimate business by Mr. Bobrick, and was created
12 and used as a legitimate corporation:

13 PACIFIC PUBLICATIONS was an on-line business
14 concept created by source. The concept was
15 every municipality, city, and incorporated
16 towns across the State of Alaska could place
17 their legislation and political information
18 in one central location. There were no sites
19 like this in Alaska, and it was difficult to
20 research different legislation related to
21 areas of Alaska.

22 ANDERSON was involved with PACIFIC
23 PUBLICATIONS. Source said in hindsight the
24 only thing ANDERSON had to offer to the
25 company was the fact he was a "sitting
26 legislator." ANDERSON was the managing
27 editor and advertiser for the company,
28 although source admits he did very little
29 work for the business and did not provide any
30 work product. Source stated ANDERSON is "kind
31 of scattered", not very focused.

32 ANDERSON recommended that Republican KEN
33 ERICKSON create the web site, which would
34 highlight different stories and have a banner
35 at the bottom with advertisements. ANDERSON
36 also recommended his legislation employee,
37 JOSH APPLEBEE, make lists of all the
38 incorporated towns and cities in Alaska.
39 APPLEBEE was also to locate a "contact
40 person" and telephone number for each contact
41 person to solicit as contributors to the

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1 site. ERICKSON and JOSH APPLEBEE were both
2 paid \$1,000 for their work. The belief for
3 ANDERSON'S involvement in the company was the
4 idea as a current legislator, ANDERSON could
5 assist companies and individuals advertise
6 and direct the ads toward politicians.
7 MICHAEL CAREY, former editor of the Editorial
8 Page of the Anchorage Daily News (ADN) told
9 source they had to "feed the beast" everyday,
10 which meant put labor and effort into the web
11 site on a daily basis. At one point, source
12 decided he/she did not want to "feed the
13 beast" daily. Source told ANDERSON he could
14 have the company. Source believed ANDERSON
15 did not want to work, and pretty much
16 "screwed it up" (the company).

17 (Exhibit A, p. 2)

18 What is also clear from the above recitation was that
19 Pacific Publishing was not a shell. Rather, it was created to
20 provide a centralized political information resource for which
21 Mr. Anderson could work segue into lobbying after retiring. In
22 the interim, Mr. Bobrick and Mr. Anderson would set up and host
23 an informational web site. They hired several employees,
24 Messrs. Erickson and Applebee, for the purpose of getting
25 requisite information and base data. Apparently, the original
26 concept, like innumerable "dot-coms" never effectively got off
the ground, but what is clear is that it was not created and
established for the purposes of acting as a shell corporation to
launder funds. It was set up by someone other than the
defendant, well prior to the time the acts constituting the
crime were thought of or committed. It was, in fact, an actual
corporation that was originally created for the purposes of

1 political news, internet advertising and promotion. Certainly,
2 it was not a fictitious entity.

3 Further, it can hardly be suggested that simply depositing
4 money from one account to another is "complex or intricate." In
5 fact, in this case it was *overly simplistic* as everything was
6 transparent, done through registered corporations with
7 legitimate bank accounts and paid by very traceable negotiable
8 instruments - standard checks. There was no layering,
9 subterfuge or offshore accounts. Contrary to the suggestion by
10 the Office of Probation, layering is typically designed to hide
11 or conceal a financial transaction through the use of numerous
12 accounts and entities or by converting one negotiable instrument
13 into another through subterfuge. There was no layering here -
14 and certainly there was not two or more layers involved in
15 depositing a check. To the contrary, Mr. Anderson merely took a
16 check from Pacific Publishing and deposited it into his own
17 company checking account. According to the Office of
18 Probation's proffered definition of "layering," almost every
19 financial transaction heretofore devised would be considering
20 layering. Every financial transaction takes one form of funds
21 and converts it to another. Here, a corporate check simply was
22 given to another. There were no checks converted to money
23 orders or cash and given to a third party or otherwise layered

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1 or even anything remotely considered "sophisticated."
2 Accordingly, the 2 point enhancement is erroneous.

3 U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(3) was adopted relatively recently which
4 explains the dearth of case law interpreting its provisions.
5 However, it was largely taken from the provision of U.S.S.G.
6 §2B1.1(b)(9)(C) applying an enhancement for "sophisticated
7 means." Generally, "sophisticated means" would involve schemes
8 that were "more complex" than an ordinary crime, *see, e.g.*
9 *United States v. Soni* 231 Fed.Appx. 612 (9th Cir.
10 2007)(unpublished); or "singularly or uniquely sophisticated",
11 *United States v. Little*, 230 Fed.Appx. 701 (9th Cir.
12 2007)(unpublished). Simply misappropriating funds and lying
13 about the origin is insufficient to support a sophisticated
14 means enhancement by clear and convincing evidence. *U.S. v.*
15 *McLaughlin* 203 Fed.Appx. 891 (9th Cir. 2006). Facts common and
16 needed to commit the crime, rather than conceal the crime, are
17 insufficient to support the sophisticated means enhancement.
18 *United States v. Montano*, 250 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2001). None
19 of the aforementioned indicia or criteria exists in this case.

20 It is equally clear that Pacific Publishing was more than a
21 shell. Pacific Publishing was established for legitimate
22 purposes and initially had a legitimate objective. It turns
23 out, according to Mr. Bobrick, that a limitation of assets and
24 resources (manpower) curtailed performance of the site and its
25

1 completion, but these facts are insufficient to demonstrate the
2 corporation being a shell. Accordingly, the adjusted offense
3 level should be 24 rather than 26.

4 **(ii) ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY**

5 "It is clear that a judge cannot rely upon the fact that a
6 defendant refuses to plead guilty and insists on his right to
7 trial as the basis for denying an acceptance of responsibility
8 adjustment." *United States v. Mohrbacher*, 182 F.3d 1041, 1052
9 (9th Cir. 1999). *See also, United States v. Vance*, 62 F.3d
10 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1995). Even a defendant who contests
11 his factual guilt at trial may, under some circumstances, be
12 entitled to such an adjustment. *See, United States v. Ing*, 70
13 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1995) (entrapment defense is not
14 inconsistent with downward adjustment for acceptance of
15 responsibility); *United States v. McKinney*, 15 F.3d 849, 852-53
16 (9th Cir. 1994) (defendant who had assisted authorities
17 immediately upon his arrest, attempted to plead guilty, and
18 declined to call any witnesses or raise an affirmative defense
19 was entitled to acceptance of responsibility credit despite
20 contesting factual guilt at trial through cross-examination of
21 prosecution witnesses).

22 First, as is clear, Mr. Anderson raised the entrapment
23 defense and, in part, proceeded to trial on that basis. He
24 never denied nor challenged the basic facts of the charges.

1 There was never a dispute that he received approximately \$12,000
2 from Pacific Publishing and \$2,000 from Mr. Prewitt and acted as
3 a consultant. At the time he received the money, however, he
4 did not believe that he was acting illegally. Rather, he
5 erroneously and indeed naively, thought that he could properly
6 serve two masters: the people of the State of Alaska and a
7 private consulting client seeking to capitalize on access to a
8 legislator. No one in these circumstances could serve two
9 masters. Mr. Anderson realized that too late.

10 Mr. Anderson never disputed that he accepted \$12,000 from
11 Pacific Publishing and \$2,000 from Mr. Prewitt. The core
12 question in this case was whether he did so with the intent to
13 do Cornell's bidding in Juneau. At first blush, Mr. Anderson
14 did not believe his efforts for Cornell involved a quid pro quo.
15 But he now recognizes and understands that the sequence of
16 events and actions he ultimately took made a finding of a quid
17 pro quo by the jury nearly inevitable. For that, Mr. Anderson
18 accepts full responsibility.

19 Mr. Anderson conveys to the Court:

20 I accept full responsibility for the choices
21 I've made and the damage I've done and the
22 damage here transcends the personal loss and
23 pain that has been suffered by my wife and
24 family. Government leaders have an obligation
25 to stand as an example and to be above reproach.
26 I badly failed to meet that standard. I hold
myself accountable for violating the public
trust. I know, and I deeply regret, that the
conduct I engaged in has damaged the public's

1 confidence in the government of the State of
2 Alaska. There are many good and dedicated men
3 and women serving in public life in Alaska and I
4 am deeply sorry for the shame, embarrassment,
5 and damage my conduct has caused them and the
6 institutions they serve.

7 **D. Sentencing Considerations**

8 In determining a fair and reasonable sentence in this case,
9 the defendant agrees that the Court is bound by the statutory
10 mandate of 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). The statute mandates that when
11 determining the proper sentence to be imposed, the Court shall
12 consider seven factors:

- 13 1. the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
14 history and characteristics of the defendant;
- 15 2. the need for the sentence imposed -
 - 16 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
17 to promote respect for the law, and to provide
18 just punishment for the offense;
 - 19 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
20 conduct;
 - 21 (C) to protect the public from further crimes
22 of the defendant; and
 - 23 (D) to provide the defendant with needed
24 educational or vocational training, medical
25 care, or other correctional treatment in the
26 most effective manner;
- 27 3. the kinds of sentences available;
- 28 4. the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
29 established for by the Guidelines;
- 30 5. any pertinent policy statement issued by the
31 Sentencing Commission; pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
32 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the
33 defendant is sentenced;
- 34 6. the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
35 among defendants; with similar records who have
36 been found guilty of similar conduct; and
- 37 7. the need to provide restitution to any victims of
38 the offense.

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1 With the exception of factors 5, 6 and 7, these considerations
2 are addressed *in seriatim*:

3 **(i) Offense Characteristics**

4 Mr. Anderson and his family recognize the serious nature
5 and gravity of the conviction in this case. Mr. Anderson
6 recognizes that his breach of the public trust has undermined
7 confidence in Alaskan government. There are, however, several
8 points that are relevant to the Court's understanding of the
9 "nature and circumstances of the offense" in this case, that he
10 respectfully requests that the Court take into consideration.

11 *First, outside of the circumstances of this case, Mr.*
12 *Anderson was a tireless and selfless representative and advocate*
13 *for the people of the State of Alaska. Mr. Anderson's exemplary*
14 *public service record, particularly in the Alaska State*
15 *Legislature, should also be considered in the Court's analysis.*
16 *A cursory review of these accomplishments, diligence, and*
17 *laudatory endeavors is recapped below.*

18 Mr. Anderson was the House Labor & Commerce Committee
19 chairman, and the vice chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
20 as a freshman legislator. This is reflective of the high
21 respect he enjoyed from his legislative colleagues who elected
22 him to those positions. He also served as the chair of the
23 Administrative Regulatory Review Committee, a joint House/Senate
24 committee, during his second term. In these roles, he sponsored

1 innovative policy initiatives, ranging from mandatory insurance
 2 coverage for colorectal cancer screening to DNA Database
 3 expansion for Alaska's Scientific Crime Lab allowing for
 4 exoneration efforts as well as preemptive identification and
 5 crime solving.

6 Many of the letters of support submitted to the court
 7 address Mr. Anderson's commitment to good public policy. The
 8 Court should also note that passage of any legislation in the
 9 Legislature requires a lengthy review process in multiple
 10 committees in both the House and Senate, subsequent approval on
 11 both body's Floors, and ultimately signature by the Governor to
 12 become effective. Often, it requires an arduous and two session
 13 endeavor. The thrust of Mr. Anderson's advocacy as a legislator
 14 focused on children's and women's issues, criminal law and
 15 public safety enhancement, education funding adequacy and
 16 teacher benefits, anti-bullying policy, law enforcement and
 17 peace officer benefits, and guardian and senior care regulatory
 18 improvements, to name a few. Mr. Anderson's successful
 19 legislation includes:

20	HB 49	EXPAND DNA DATABASE	ANDERSON, HAWKER	CHAPTER 88 SLA 03	06/13/03
21	HB 216	FUEL FUND/MUNI TAX : REFINED FUEL PRODUCTS	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 117 SLA 03	06/18/03
22	HB 418	REAL ESTATE COM'N/LICENSEE/HOME INSPECT	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 106 SLA 04	06/29/04
23	HB 421	DEED OF TRUST RECONVEYANCE	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 113 SLA 04	06/29/04
24	HB 423	TAXICAB DRIVER LIABILITY	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 69 SLA 04	06/16/04
25	HB 427	GUARDIANS, CONSERVATORS, OPA, ETC	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 84 SLA 04	06/25/04
26	HB 467	COMMEMORATIVE QUARTERS COMMISSION	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 33 SLA 04	06/03/04

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1	HB 476	AK STATEHOOD CELEBRATION COMMISSION	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 122 SLA 04	06/29/04
2	HB 517	SECURITY ACCOUNT BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 121 SLA 04	06/29/04
3	HB 540	WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE RATES	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 62 SLA 04	06/16/04
4	HB 542	CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 144 SLA 04	06/30/04
5	HB 81	CONTRACTORS & HOME INSPECTORS	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 9 SLA 06	03/23/06
6	HB 115	AIRPORT CUSTOMER FACILITY CHARGES	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 5 SLA 05	04/01/05
7	HB 123	OCCUPATIONAL BDS: EXTENSION/RECEIPTS/PSYCH	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 36 SLA 05	06/02/05
8	HB 124	COLLECTION OF DNA/USE OF FORCE	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 12 SLA 05	05/05/05
9	HB 216	INSURANCE RATES, FORMS, AND FILING	LABOR & COMMERCE	CHAPTER 88 SLA 05	08/04/05
10	HB 393	INSURANCE FOR COLORECTAL CANCER SCREENING	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 97 SLA 06	08/02/06
11	HB 482	SCHOOL BULLYING & HARASS POLICIES	ANDERSON	CHAPTER 109 SLA 05	08/08/06

Beyond passage of important and beneficial legislation, Mr. Anderson was pivotal in crossing party lines and emphasizing bi-partisanship. He was appointed as the AMATS legislative designee from the House, created to improve metropolitan transportation in conjunction with the *20/20 Transportation Plan*. While a Republican by affiliation, Mr. Anderson was unanimously chosen by his Anchorage House Democrat and Republican colleagues for four consecutive years, the longest serving chairman of the Anchorage Caucus. There was never an Anchorage Caucus agenda that did not include Mayor Mark Begich, or members of the School Board, Assembly and University.

Mr. Anderson also served on the Anchorage Parking Authority, Municipal Light & Power Commission, Zoning Board of Examiners & Appeals, Anchorage School Board, and multiple non-

1 profit boards ranging from the Big Brothers Big Sisters and
2 Alaska Special Olympics Boards to the Alaska Theater of Youth
3 Board and Anchorage Neighborhood Health Center Finance Advisory
4 Committee. In concert with his legislative accomplishments,
5 these activities reinforce consideration by the Court of a
6 downward departure for exemplary service to Alaska.

7 Second, by the time the conspiracy that was the focus of
8 this case commenced, each of the co-conspirators referenced,
9 namely Mr. Bobrick, had become personal friends of Mr. Anderson.
10 Mr. Anderson socialized with Bobrick and trusted him.
11 Anderson's family likewise socialized often with Bobrick's
12 family and friends. This took place in a variety of settings,
13 from informal game nights to performances at the PAC. Over
14 time, Mr. Anderson permitted that personal relationship to cloud
15 his moral and ethical judgment.

16 **(ii) Offender Characteristics**

17 In addition to the offense conduct, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1)
18 also requires that the Court consider the "history and
19 characteristics of the defendant." It is sufficient for
20 purposes of Section 3553(a)(1) to highlight several relevant
21 conclusions about Mr. Anderson that cannot be seriously disputed
22 and which should mitigate the severity of the punishment needed
23 in this case. This factor weighs heavily in favor of imposing a
24 sentence well below the Guidelines range.

1 Tom Anderson is not a hardened criminal nor is he a man who
2 threatens society. He stands before the Court without any prior
3 criminal record; a man who deeply loves his family and friends
4 and certainly wished nobody harm. His character, his
5 generosity, his general good nature – all these fine qualities
6 showed themselves often and in abundance throughout his life,
7 yet they were not the focus of the lengthy trial that resulted
8 in his conviction. The trial focused almost exclusively on
9 actions, decisions, and judgments Mr. Anderson made that were
10 wrong. Yet, it is beyond question that Mr. Anderson did many
11 more things right during his numerous years in public life. The
12 Defense implores the Court, under Section 3553, to carefully
13 consider his good acts in fashioning a just sentence.

14 Before his conviction in this case, Mr. Anderson had no
15 prior criminal convictions and lived his life as a law-abiding
16 citizen. He is also a loving man, who cares deeply for his wife
17 and children. Further, he is widely respected for his kind
18 heart and generous spirit. Mr. Anderson has been active in
19 local and national charities both before and after he entered
20 the Legislature. His charitable works have included the
21 donation of significant time and money to charitable and civic
22 organizations. Mr. Anderson accumulated a long record of public
23 and charitable service to our state and community.

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1 In his early 20s, he was appointed by Mayor Rick Mystrom to
2 the Municipal Light & Power Commission and ultimately served as
3 vice-chairman. He was appointed by Mayor George Wuerch and
4 served on the Zoning Board of Examiners and Appeals with honor.
5 In a well-publicized and very public application process, Mr.
6 Anderson was chosen by sitting Anchorage School Board members to
7 fill a vacancy, in competition against 29 other well-qualified
8 applicants (four of whom later served in the Board) in 2000, and
9 he received the Anchorage School District's *Award of Excellence*
10 in 2001. Later, in 2002, he earned the Chamber of Commerce's *Top*
11 *40 Under 40 Award*. From the Alaska Traumatic Brain Injury
12 Association to the N.A.A.C.P., his volunteer efforts are
13 substantive.

14 Beyond numerous bills and legislation passed for public
15 safety enhancement and education, health and urban design as a
16 state legislator over four years of service, he also received
17 numerous awards including recognition from the Anchorage Fire
18 Employees Association and Public Safety Employees Association,
19 as well as the Anchorage Police Department Employees
20 Association's *Recognition of Outstanding Efforts on Behalf of*
21 *Law Enforcement Professionals* in 2004, and the *David P. Hutchen*
22 *Public Service Award* from the Alaska Power Association in 2005
23 for protecting the interests of electric consumers.

1 The Defense recognizes that pursuant to USSG §5H1.11
2 charitable, civic, public service and other goods works are not
3 ordinarily considered a basis for a departure. However, in a
4 post-Booker environment the Court may and should consider Mr.
5 Anderson's civic, charitable and public service as a sentencing
6 factor pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).

7 The Sentencing Commission identifies these offender
8 characteristics as normally not relevant to the departure
9 decision, but also notes that they may be pertinent "if a
10 combination of such circumstances makes the case an exceptional
11 one." U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.H, intro. comment. Guidelines policy
12 statements specifically provide that the Court "may depart from
13 the applicable guideline range based on a combination of two or
14 more offender characteristics or other circumstances, none of
15 which independently is sufficient to provide a basis for
16 departure" if those characteristics, taken together, make the
17 case exceptional, and each unique offender characteristic is
18 present to a substantial degree.

19 For instance, in *United States v. Canova*, 412 F.3d 331 (2nd
20 Cir. 2005), the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of a
21 wide-ranging conspiracy to defraud the Medicare Program of \$5
22 million and of making false statements to the government. The
23 district court ultimately determined that the defendant's base
24 offense level was fourteen (14) and, with no criminal history,

1 set the Guidelines range at fifteen (15) to twenty-one (21)
2 months. However, relying on the defendant's prior community
3 service as a volunteer fire-fighter and his prior honorable
4 service in the military, the district court departed by six (6)
5 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5K2.0. As a consequence, the
6 district court sentenced the defendant to four (4) consecutive
7 *probationary* terms of one (1) year. *Id.* at 334-36,343. On
8 appeal of the sentence by the United States, the Second Circuit
9 affirmed the departure. The Court of Appeals explained that,
10 while Guidelines §5H1.11 discourages departures on the basis of
11 military service and civic contributions, it does not prohibit
12 such departures if those factors are present to a substantial
13 degree. *Id.* at 358. Mr. Anderson's considerable charitable,
14 civic and good works likewise should be considered by the Court.

15 Further, as the letters from some of those friends, family
16 members and colleagues attest, Mr. Anderson is a devoted, kind
17 and generous man, often putting the interests of others before
18 his own. Although many character letters were submitted to the
19 Court, the following briefly highlights excerpts of letters
20 indicative of Tom Anderson's character.

- 21 ➤ Tom Anderson is a hardworking, kind, generous and
22 most importantly for you to consider, complex man. I
23 think you'll find, upon deep reflection, Tom
24 Anderson is a good man with a good heart. He will
25 suffer from his mistakes, based on the true
26 character and contemplative Tom I know and
appreciate, irrespective of any sentence you impose.

1 *James Patton, Friend*

2 ➤ If I were to recommend Tom Anderson today, for a
3 position in public service or leadership, I would
4 still do it with 100 percent confidence in him as a
5 man of integrity and commitment despite the charges
6 and conviction against him. Tom is an honest man.
7 I knew him at age 19, when as chairman of the Young
8 Republicans, I recruited him to join our
9 organization. He and I have shared, over the years,
10 many details about our lives and things that only
11 good friends would share. We pursued lots of
12 campaigns together. I've walked with him through
13 his personal relationships; I've watched him study
14 for and earn his legal degree; and I've seen him
15 develop his consulting business. In conclusion,
16 while I would quickly describe Tom as competent,
17 funny, and a fighter, Tom is also genuine. He has
18 expressed his remorsefulness to me, regarding the
19 mark on public perception, due to his actions. He
20 recognizes the distinct line between public duty and
21 personal gain and has repented for his sloppiness.
22 I have witnessed him grow through this challenge.

13 *Eugene Harnett, Friend and Colleague*

14 ➤ I have known Rep. Anderson since before his election
15 to any public office. While Tom was an aide to the
16 Alaska House of Representatives I recall working
17 with him as a University of Alaska college student
18 lobbying for increased University funding. In my
19 dealings with him in that capacity, I found him to
20 be incredibly helpful and generous with his time.
21 He was often willing to take an extra minute to
22 offer advice on the legislative process and how I
23 might be more effective in my appointed task. Since
24 then, I have gotten to know Tom further as a friend,
25 supporter, and former employee. Personally, Tom has
26 always shown a tremendous amount of generosity and
sincerity. On numerous occasions, Tom has offered
the use of his own vehicle or a place to stay in the
midst of personal turmoil.

23 *Heath E. Hilyard, Friend and Colleague*

24 ➤ Tom Anderson and I served on the Big Brothers Big
25 Sisters Board of Directors and Anchorage School

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Board together. I also supported his first election and re-election to the State House in Muldoon. He was our family's state representative for four years, and I worked with him while I served on the Northeast Community Council Board. In that time he was responsive, attentive, and showed care in his representation whether dealing with the vandalism at Susitna Elementary, or the obtrusive snow mound three stories high across from our neighborhood, or when it came to securing much needed funding for a traffic calming study on Muldoon Road and added revenue to spark the ribbon-breaking for the Creekside Town Center construction. From supporting the military Stryker Brigade Base fence to enhancing park and urban design in Muldoon, Tom was our champion. What most impressed me was Tom's good heart.

John Floyd, Colleague and Constituent

- I have always found Tom to be sincere, motivated and intent on making our city, and the state, a better place to live. As much as that may sound like a broad sweeping statement, it is important you know just how many areas Tom has centered his efforts, and aggressively pursued changes for the better in our community, and done it all purely for helping people.

Rina Salazar, Friend

- I know Tom has been crushed by the allegations from the United States; feels repentant and contrite for his actions having embarrassed the Legislature and impugned the process; and now he only seeks to become a better man, for the sake of his God, family, State and self. He may have broken the law, but he still has humility.

Connie Graff, Family Friend

- Tom has been brutally honest with me regarding the developments of his trial. I know he is hurting greatly inside on every level I can imagine. Most, Tom loves his children and wants to hurt them as little as possible. Obviously, damage has been done and will be done. Given our all-too-short lives, I would request the Court be mindful that the longer

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Tom is separated from his children and his loved ones, the more damage will be done and less time will be afforded for the hoped-for healing.

Lou Sheehan, Friend

➤ In the case of former Rep. Anderson, I wish to convey a fairly straightforward message. Tom was a good legislator. In my opinion, he had the best interest of Alaskans on his moral and ethical compass. Conversely, people make mistakes. A person like Tom, who quite honestly, would give you the shirt off of his back, and then interrupt you as you thank him because he has a million thoughts in his head, is a unique person. I truly think that this personality dynamic of Tom Anderson the "legislator," is what put him into the fix he now finds himself. He was too aggressive to help people, and too naïve or ill-prepared to recognize that politics and business are often comparable to a jungle at times, where motivations of an advocacy overrides concern for the public servant.

John Harris, Friend and Colleague

➤ Our son has had public service in his blood. Perhaps it is genetic. Tom's father was the former director of the Alaska State Troopers, and a former member of the United States Army and Seattle Fire Department. I worked with the Alaska Peace Officers Association and ran the Defensive Driving Programs for many years. Young Tom's Grandpa Torgny Anderson was a county commissioner and mayor in Minnesota. Of the Anderson Family, Torgny's father Tonnes was the first legislator, serving in the House of Minnesota's State Legislature. Our son Tom comes from a long line of public servants dedicated to making our communities better...."

Christiane Anderson, Mother

All of these very positive offender characteristics evidence a man who has devoted his adult life to Alaska, his family and his community, and can grasp an understanding of his wrongdoing. Any punishment that can be called "just" and

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1 reasonable should account for the contributions and contrition
2 of such a man.

3 **(iii) Seriousness of the Offense and Providing a Just
4 Punishment**

5 18 U.S.C. §3553 also requires the Court to impose a
6 sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense, promote
7 respect for the law and to provide a just punishment.

8 In analyzing the seriousness of the offense, one can not
9 avoid the obvious: Mr. Anderson stands convicted of having
10 violated the Hobbs Act. He fully recognizes, accepts, and
11 acknowledges this fact. But recognition of the seriousness of
12 the offense does not *necessarily* compel the imposition of a
13 lengthy term of incarceration. An analysis of all of the
14 relevant sentencing factors, and sentencing policy, suggest that
15 a two to three year sentence may be imposed; such a sentence
16 would most certainly meet the *ends of justice* and fairly reflect
17 the seriousness of the offense.

18 **(iv) Deterrence**

19 Deterrence to criminal conduct is one of the major
20 considerations embodied in 18 U.S.C. §3553. Certainly, the
21 lessons learned over the past two and a half years suggest that
22 the consequences of criminal conduct are dire and often quite
23 severe. Indictment or no indictment, conviction or no
24 conviction, for the vast majority of Alaska citizens, Tom
25 Anderson was guilty of misusing his office before a single

1 witness took the stand in this case. The investigation itself
2 has turned his life upside down. Many of his friends and
3 associates were interviewed merely because they knew Tom
4 Anderson. Mr. Anderson's reputation has been destroyed. A
5 politician or political employee since college, his political
6 life is over.

7 Because of the media coverage of this and related cases,
8 there is no need for the Court to sentence Mr. Anderson to a
9 period of incarceration beyond a 27 to 33 month parameter in an
10 effort to deter future conduct. Mr. Anderson's case is a
11 cautionary tale of what happens when one violates the public's
12 trust by ignoring one's conscience and allowing oneself to be
13 motivated by ambition and manipulated by the "carrot" of earning
14 income improperly while being a public servant.

15 Politicians, staff, lobbyists and public officials in
16 Alaska are all familiar with the Prewitt-Bobrick-Anderson case
17 and former Rep. Anderson's role. Moreover, they are aware that,
18 as a result of his misdeeds, Tom Anderson was publicly
19 disgraced, is now deeply in debt, and has lost his professional
20 reputation, job, financial security, Alaska Permanent Fund
21 dividend, and right to vote. Mr. Anderson's life will never be
22 the same and his story already serves as a deterrent for
23 colleagues and government officials in Alaska.

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1 Mr. Anderson has lost his remaining political career and
2 will effectively be foreclosed from public service. In all
3 likelihood, he will be prohibited from practicing law for life
4 as well as severely limited and potentially denied from
5 acquiring a real estate, mortgage, securities or insurance
6 license, the very areas he might reasonably pursue with his
7 educational background. Further, he has been subjected to the
8 ostracism of his friends, family, co-workers and associates.

9 Tom Anderson will now be labeled a "felon." As such, the
10 collateral consequences are indeed severe. Absent an
11 extraordinarily unlikely presidential pardon, he: has lost his
12 right to vote (ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2.); forever lost his
13 right to serve on a federal jury (28 U.S.C. §1865(b)(5));
14 forever lost his right to possess any type of firearm (18 U.S.C.
15 §§921 - 930,); is largely disqualified from most state and
16 federal employment; suffers specifically imposed occupational
17 restrictions (18 U.S.C. §§3563(b)(5), 3583(d)); is prohibited
18 from obtaining most types of federal licensure (21 U.S.C.
19 §862(d)(1)); is precluded from obtaining employment with any
20 type of federally recognized labor organization of employee
21 benefit plan (29 U.S.C. §§504, 1111); may become ineligible for
22 grants, licenses, contracts, public housing and other federal
23 benefits (21 U.S.C. §862 and 42 U.S.C. §1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii)); is
24 no longer eligible to receive food stamps or temporary
25

1 assistance to needy families, and the amount payable to any
2 family or household of which such a person is a member is
3 reduced proportionately (21 U.S.C. §§862a(a), (b), (d)(2); and
4 will face severe limitations on international travel because of
5 anti-felon policies.

6 The judicial system is well equipped to provide adequate
7 means of deterrence for future criminal conduct. By the
8 imposition of even a modest period of incarceration and lengthy
9 period of supervised release with special conditions, the Court
10 can contour a punishment with systemic safeguards. Monitored
11 through the Office of Probation, the Court can require that Mr.
12 Anderson inform any potential future employer of his crime; the
13 Court can require that Mr. Anderson not be employed in a
14 position involving public trust; and he can be required to
15 submit to home confinement conditions, submittal of detailed
16 financial statements and any other conditions that the Court
17 believes will adequately deter future criminal conduct.

18 **(v) Protect the Public from Future Criminal Conduct**

19 The need to protect the public from the Mr. Anderson is
20 also one of the critical sentencing factors to be considered.
21 However, it can hardly be suggested that Mr. Anderson is a
22 hardened criminal with a long past of endangering public safety
23 or putting anyone but himself at risk. He is a 40-year-old
24 member of the community with no criminal history and it appears
25

1 unlikely that the public needs to be protected in the future
2 from Mr. Anderson. This is certainly not a situation where
3 incarceration is the only means available to protect the public
4 from future criminal conduct. Indeed, public safety should not
5 even be considered a factor due, in part, to the societal
6 isolation Mr. Anderson is already facing.

7 **(vi) Kinds of Sentences Available**

8 It is not surprising that there is a dearth of authority
9 and academic study over the last 23 years discussing
10 alternatives to incarceration as the United States Sentencing
11 Guidelines typically did not permit a wide range of
12 discretionary alternatives once certain Guideline levels were
13 mathematically attained. This Court, however, now has the
14 discretionary authority to consider alternative sentences for
15 Mr. Anderson. As discussed below, it is suggested that a
16 lengthy term of incarceration, under these circumstances, is the
17 least effective method in achieving stated Congressional
18 sentencing policy - even under the previously determinate
19 U.S.S.G. sentencing system. It bodes no less beneficial to his
20 family, either.

21 One of the primary purposes of our national sentencing
22 policy and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is rehabilitation.
23 However, little documentary evidence exists to support the
24 proposition that incarceration has any effect on rehabilitation
25

1 whatsoever. A May 2004 study conducted by the United States
2 Sentencing Commission belies the critical assumption that a
3 period of incarceration for a first time offender had any effect
4 on rates of recidivism. *Recidivism and the First Offender*,
5 United States Sentencing Commission May 2004. In fact, the
6 conclusion of the study appears to point to the contrary: The
7 more involvement one had in the criminal justice system and the
8 longer in prison, the higher the rate of recidivism. An
9 analysis of the study suggests that recidivism risk is lowest
10 for those offenders with the least experience in the criminal
11 justice system. To some, these results are not surprising. In
12 2001, the Honorable Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of
13 New York pre-empted an explanation for this seeming anomaly:

14 "It is not surprising that rehabilitation continues to
15 be linked primarily with failed attempts to reform
16 inmates while they are incarcerated. The great
17 shortcomings of the American rehabilitative model have
18 taken place in the context of incarceration. See, e.g.,
19 *Powell v. Texas*, 392 U.S. 514, 530, 88 S.Ct. 2145,
20 2153, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion)
21 (Marshall, J.) ("[I]t can hardly be said with assurance
22 that incarceration serves [therapeutic or
23 rehabilitative] purposes ... for the general run of
24 criminals"); Matthew W. Meskell, Note, *The History of
25 Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877*, 51
26 *Stan. L.Rev.* 839 (1999) (eighteenth and nineteenth-
century American penal system was founded on the
philosophy of Dr. Benjamin Rush, who "argued that
reformation and deterrence of crime ought to be the
sole goals of punishment, that the contemporary
criminal codes tended to harden criminals and engender
hatred towards the government, and that imprisonment
should be used as the primary criminal punishment.").

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1 Indeed, it can be fairly argued that national sentencing
2 policy is fostered, not by mandating long periods of
3 incarceration, but by the utilization of alternatives to prison.
4 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 has always provided sentencing
5 judges with some level of flexibility to consider which of the
6 core sentencing principles: retribution, deterrence,
7 incapacitation, and rehabilitation, are most important in a
8 particular case, and to provide alternatives to incarceration
9 where necessary in carrying out statutory goals. These four
10 core principles have guided sentencing policy and implementation
11 in one form or another since at least 1984. See, e.g., Kate
12 Stith & José A. Cabranes, *Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines*
13 *in the Federal Courts* 41 (1998).

14 The United States Sentencing Guidelines themselves, along
15 with sound sentencing and penological philosophy, have always
16 permitted the courts to view alternatives to prisons in
17 appropriate and defined circumstances and to craft individual
18 sentencing in appropriate cases. Historically, Congress
19 recognized that the sentencing judge must have the flexibility
20 to emphasize one purpose of sentencing over others based upon
21 the individual circumstances of an offender and an offense.
22 See, S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 58- 59 (1983) ("The intent... is to
23 recognize the four purposes that sentencing in general is
24 designed to achieve, and to require that the judge consider what
25

1 impact, if any, each particular purpose should have on the
2 sentence in each case."). "The statute (SRA) gave the U.S.
3 Sentencing Commission... broad authority to structure sanctions,
4 to permit judges to individualize sentences, to be parsimonious
5 in the use of punishment, to use non-prison sentences for
6 nonviolent first offenders, and to avoid overcrowding federal
7 prisons." Note, *What Did the United States Sentencing*
8 *Commission Miss?* 101 Yale L.J. 1773, 1773 (1992).

9 In determining whether an alternative to lengthy
10 incarceration is appropriate, courts have examined several
11 general issues, including the risk a particular offender poses
12 to the public, the harm caused by the crime, the defendant's
13 prior criminal behavior, his or her likelihood of committing
14 another crime and potential hardship to others. *Cf.* Model Penal
15 Code § 7.01. Such alternatives for the court to consider are
16 substantial periods of probation/supervised release, community
17 service, drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, home
18 confinement, electronic monitoring or any combination of the
19 above. Thus, it is suggested that this court can be highly
20 consistent and in all probability fashion a sentence for Mr.
21 Anderson sans a period of incarceration exceeding 27 to 33
22 months and still maintain the spirit and intent of congressional
23 sentencing policy.

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1 It is respectfully suggested that the Court consider
2 imposing a sentence for an incarceration period of 27 to 33
3 months, and give Mr. Anderson the opportunity to seek the much
4 needed and required reflection and punishment necessary for
5 moral rehabilitation. It is suggested that a consideration of
6 "public protection" does not warrant a lengthy prison sentence.

7 **E. Aberrant Behavior**

8 For purposes of U.S.S.G. §5K2.20 policy statement -
9 "Aberrant behavior" means a single criminal occurrence or single
10 criminal transaction that (A) was committed without significant
11 planning; (B) was of limited duration; and (C) represents a
12 marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding
13 life.

14 In considering the application of §5K2.20, "the sentencing
15 court must conduct two separate and independent inquiries, both
16 of which the defendant must satisfy before a departure can be
17 granted. That is, the court must determine whether the
18 defendant's case is extraordinary and whether his or her conduct
19 constituted aberrant behavior." *United States v. Castano-*
20 *Vasquez*, 266 F.3d 228, 235 (3rd Cir. 2001); *see also, United*
21 *States v. Jimenez*, 282 F.3d 597, 602 (8th Cir. 2002). In *United*
22 *States v. Guerrero*, 333 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) the court held
23 that prior to departing downward for aberrant behavior under
24 §5K2.20, a sentencing court must find both that the case is

1 extraordinary and that the behavior was aberrant under the
2 three-factor test. Obviously, in a post-*Booker* environment, the
3 Court is not strictly bound by the requisite triptych analysis
4 and can consider the aberrant nature of the crime in its
5 analysis required under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). A single act of
6 aberrant behavior can support a departure. *United States v.*
7 *Fairless*, 975 F.2d 664(9th Cir. 1992).

8 The crime, in Mr. Anderson's case, was committed without
9 significant planning. Although, to be sure, there was some
10 planning involved in the nature of the work that Mr. Anderson
11 would be doing with Mr. Bobrick. Both gentlemen were friends
12 and, as is clear, Mr. Bobrick ultimately wanted to depart from
13 the lobbying business but did not want to simply "drop" the
14 clients that he nurtured and represented. (See, Exhibit A, p.
15 2; PSI ¶ 58). According to the Government and the trial
16 testimony, Mr. Bobrick believed he could have a political
17 website and lobbying firm with Mr. Anderson, and gradually
18 transition out of the business. Indeed, PSI ¶ 61 accurately
19 portrays the planning involved in the anticipated endeavor:

20 According to Bobrick, Pacific Publications was an on-
21 line business concept created by Bobrick. The concept
22 was every municipality, city, and incorporated towns
23 across the state of Alaska could place their
24 legislation and political information in one central
25 location. There were no sites like this in Alaska, and
26 it was difficult to research different legislation
related to areas of Alaska. Bobrick advised that
Anderson was involved with Pacific Publications.
Bobrick stated that in hindsight, the only thing

1 Anderson had to offer to the company was the fact that
2 he was a "sitting legislator." Anderson was the
3 managing editor and advertiser for the company,
4 although Bobrick admitted that Anderson did very little
5 work for the business and did not provide any work
6 product.

7 "The belief for Anderson's involvement in the company was the
8 idea as a current legislator, Mr. Anderson could assist
9 companies and individuals advertise and direct the ads toward
10 politicians." (PSI ¶ 62). Most of the planning was between Mr.
11 Bobrick and Frank Prewitt - largely unbeknownst to Mr. Anderson.
12 It is undisputed that in July or August 2004 Mr. Bobrick
13 established Pacific Publications and funded it largely through
14 money obtained from Cornell Corrections. (See, PSI ¶¶ 28, 29).
15 Certainly Mr. Anderson was not involved in initially creating or
16 funding Pacific Publishing. Nor was he yet involved in any
17 conspiracy as he had not been approached by Mr. Bobrick with
18 respect to Cornell. In fact it was on July 21, 2004 that Mr.
19 Bobrick initially contacted Mr. Prewitt with respect to
20 enlisting Mr. Anderson. (See PSI ¶ 24.) The first time there
21 was any mention of a quid pro quo, or that Mr. Anderson had any
22 specific knowledge of the methodology of payment, was on August
23 17, 2004. By that time most of the planning had been done by
24 others and was done prior to Mr. Anderson even entering the
25 conspiracy hatched between Messrs. Bobrick and Prewitt.

26 As to the limited duration, it is admitted, as it must be,
that Mr. Anderson received money over a four month period of

1 time beginning on August 21, 2004 and ending on December 21,
2 2004. Certainly such was of limited duration.

3 Lastly, it is clear that Mr. Anderson's conduct is without
4 question a marked deviation from an otherwise law abiding life.
5 We point out that the parties concur that Mr. Anderson has a
6 Criminal History Category of 1 with no prior arrests or
7 convictions. It is beyond the pale to suggest that Mr. Anderson
8 did not lead an exemplary and law abiding life.

9 **F. ATA Contract**

10 The draft PSI initially suggested that a two level
11 enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(1) be applied as Mr.
12 Anderson's consulting contract with the ATA was a separate
13 bribe. The Defense objected and the Office of Probation
14 ultimately agreed. It is anticipated that the Government may
15 object to the final PSI in this regard and the Defense desires
16 to address the issue.

17 It appears that the Government has taken the position that
18 payments received from the ATA were separate, singular acts of
19 bribery from the acts of bribery that Mr. Anderson was convicted
20 of. The Defense vehemently disagrees. First, it is pointed out
21 that at no time was Mr. Anderson charged, indicted or convicted
22 for his conduct with respect to the ATA payments. As a result,
23 he was never afforded the opportunity to defend against these
24 charges. However, it now appears that the Government may seek

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1 to punish him upon mere conjecture and for conduct that he has
2 never been convicted of having committed. As well, he would
3 even be denied the opportunity to defend against these charges,
4 face his alleged accuser or be afforded any form of due process
5 relative to these serious allegations. The Court's attention is
6 directed to the Ninth Circuit's admonition in *United States v.*
7 *Hahn*, 960 F.2d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1993):

8 "In mandating penal consequences for "relevant conduct"
9 in certain cases, the Guidelines implicate the
10 principles enunciated in *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358,
11 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). See *Restrepo*,
12 946 F.2d at 659-60 & n. 9; *id.* at 664 (Norris, J.,
13 dissenting) ("[i]n allowing... separate crimes to be
14 used as sentencing factors with mandatory penal
15 consequences, the Guidelines encounter the due process
16 mandate of [*Winship*]"); *United States v. Miller*, 910
17 F.2d 1321, 1330-31 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J.,
18 dissenting), *cert. denied*, 498 U.S. 1094, 111 S.Ct.
19 980, 112 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1991). *Winship*, of course,
20 interprets due process to "protect[] the accused
21 against conviction except upon proof beyond a
22 reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
23 the crime... charged." 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at
24 1073. Although facts pertinent to sentencing under the
25 Guidelines normally need only be proved by a
26 preponderance, *Restrepo*, 946 F.2d at 661, such facts
frequently amount to criminal conduct apart from the
offenses of conviction.

27 The Government cannot prove by a preponderance of the
28 evidence that Mr. Anderson committed any illegal act with
29 respect to the ATA. Indeed, the PSI points out at ¶ 72 that Mr.
30 Anderson did, in fact, perform work for the fees in question.
31 Further, we note that the record is devoid of any evidence that
32 Mr. Anderson took any official or unofficial legislative action

1 with respect to any issues that may have affected the ATA. It
2 is insufficient for the purposes of providing an enhancement
3 that "the Government maintains that this was an additional
4 corrupt contract." (Draft PSI ¶ 79.) The Government must prove
5 that it was a corrupt contract and we do not believe a scintilla
6 of evidence exists to that end. It is wholly improper to attempt
7 to conclude that Mr. Anderson's work with the ATA was anything
8 but a legitimate and permissible consulting contract. The
9 testimony of James Rowe conclusively established that money
10 received from the ATA was legally obtained. The entire
11 transcript of Mr. Rowe is attached, but the critical passage is:

12 Paul Stockler: And do you remember how much the
13 Telephone Association paid him?

14 James Rowe: It was \$5,000 a month.

15 PS: OK. And what kind of work did he do for that
16 \$5,000 per month?

17 JR: We gave Tom a package that included the
18 Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is a fascinating
19 document, and a number of, a piece of legislation that
20 had passed I think the prior year, perhaps it might
21 have been two years before that was very significant to
22 the state of Alaska. And some decisions, copies of
23 some decisions and orders that came down from the
24 Regulatory Commission of Alaska. And there were things
25 that we were unhappy with, particularly in things
26 coming from the Commission. So what it was: We were
asking him to do research on how these were going to
affect the public policy, if the State enacted
legislation that would do such-and-such a thing. What

1 would be the impact on rural customers, and things of
that nature?

2 Actual work was performed by Mr. Anderson on matters
3 unrelated to his position in the Legislature. To elucidate this
4 point, Mr. Rowe continued:

5
6 PS: Did, did the two of you ever have a discussion that
7 the work and the money were paying him would not be
connected in any way to legislative work?

8 JR: I understood that. I'm confident he did as well.

9 PS: OK. I assume he completed his work in December,
10 and then he returned to the Legislature the following
11 year?

12 JR: He did.

13 Last, on this point, ATA and Mr. Anderson had a written
14 consulting contract (with payments made via check and duly
15 deposited in Mr. Anderson's consulting firm's account).

16 PS: And the contract required him to do certain things
17 for that \$5,000 a month?

18 JR: That's correct.

19 PS: And did he fulfill the terms of that contract?

20 JR: He did.

21 PS: Would there have been any reason to invoice you
22 after done?

23 JR: Only if we failed to do our part and send him the
24 check on a monthly basis.

1 It defies credulity to suggest that someone would take a
2 bribe or participate in an extortionate scheme, in violation of
3 the Hobbs Act, pursuant to a written contract, properly deposit
4 those funds and pay taxes on the income received. At all
5 relevant times, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Rowe, along with others at
6 the ATA, were very public about the consulting contract.

7 There is no basis for the Government to plausibly posit
8 that the payments made by the ATA had any form of *quid pro quo*
9 attached or in return for any official act. The Supreme Court
10 has held that the Hobbs Act requires proof of a *quid pro quo*
11 agreement between the contributor and the public officer.
12 *McCormick v. United States*, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). Alternatively,
13 "the Government need only show that a public official has
14 obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that
15 the payment was made in return for official acts." *Evans v.*
16 *United States*, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). Here there is absolutely no
17 evidence of a *quid pro quo* or any official act being taken and
18 the assertion that the ATA payments were unlawful is nothing
19 short of a bald contrivance. Thus, we respectfully request that
20 the Court overrule the Government's objection, should it be
21 offered, with respect to the addition of the 2 points as
22 provided for in U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(1).

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H. Conclusion

For the reasons, arguments and law as stated herein, the Defense respectfully requests that the Court craft a fair and reasonable sentence of incarceration for Mr. Anderson, not to exceed 33 months. Further, it is respectfully requested that the Court reject imposition of any fine upon Mr. Anderson beyond the Bureau of Prison \$100 fine, per count, due at the Sentencing Hearing. The Court is also urged to limit the term of supervised release to no more than one year, following incarceration.

DATED this 8th day of October, 2007 at Anchorage, Alaska.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 8th day of October, 2007, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served electronically on the following:

- Joseph W. Bottini, Assistant U.S. Attorney
- James A. Goeke, Assistant U.S. Attorney
- Edward C. Nucci, Acting Chief, Public Integrity Section
- Nicholas A. Marsh, Trial Attorney, Public Integrity Section
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